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The bright promise of economy and efficiency that comput-
ers suggest, coupled with the mystery that surrounds their opera-
tion, makes the businessman ripe for exploitation by the charlatan
and legitimate data processor alike. During the decade of the
1960's, the growing' data processing services industry was aided
by the "mystique of the computer".' Due to their lack of knowl-
edge about computers in general, many businessmen had false
hopes that they would solve all of their decisionmaking problems.
Those businesses which could not justify a computer "in house"
turned to computer service bureaus.3 A blind faith in the capac-
ities of the computer made it easy for the customer to tolerate the
difficulties that arose.4  The situation was analogous to the early
days of the railroad, the automobile, and the airplane, when the
consumer wanted only to take a ride and did not ask for guaran-
ties. 5
Today the situation is changing and the service bureaus are
taking a long overdue look at their role in providing commercially
useful services." Their customers, in turn, will predictably begin
1. Data processing service companies that offer their services to the gen-
eral public virtually did not exist prior to 1960. By 1969 they had grown into
a $2 billion segment of the economy, employing 120,000 persons and serving
220,000 customers. 17 DATAMATION, Mar. 1, 1971, at 50-51.
2. Bigelow, Contract Caveats, 16 DATAMATION, Sept. 15, 1970, at 41.
Cf. Roy, The Changing Role of the Service Bureau, 16 DATAMATION, Mar. 1970,
at 52 [hereinafter cited as Roy]; Brown, Programming: The Quiet Evolution,
18 DATAMATION, March 1972, at 147, 149 [hereinafter cited as Brown].
3. Roy, supra note 2. Service bureaus have been judicially defined as
those who "sell data processing services to businesses generally", Association of
Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970).
4. See, e.g., the history of the relationship between the parties in Clements
Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 298 F. Supp. 115, 119-25 (D. Minn. 1969).
See also Bigelow, Contract Caveats, 16 DATAMATION, Sept. 15, 1970, at 41;
Brown, supra note 2. The patience of the clientele accounts for the paucity of
appellate cases. See Landy, Bibliography on Law and Computer Technology, 4
LAW AND COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 136 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Landy], for
a relatively complete list of the cases to-date. Note the errata to Landy at
5 LAW AND COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 28 (1972).
5. Spangenberg, Torts, in LAW AND COMPUTERS IN THE MID-SIXTIEs 58
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Spangenberg], discusses parallels between the im-
pact of railroad technology on law and what might be expected from computer
technology.
6. Roy, supra note 2; Bigelow, Contract Caveats, 16 DATAMATION, Sept.
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to demand a more businesslike and less venturesome attitude;
these customers will undoubtedly turn increasingly to their attor-
neys for advice on how to ensure that they get the benefits they
seek from data processing services. 7
The recent Eighth Circuit decision in Clements Auto Com-
pany v. Service Bureau Corporation8 demonstrates that at least
some courts will hold commercial data processors liable for failing
to work the magic they claimed their machines were capable of
producing. The thrust of this decision strongly suggests that data
processing services will be required to live up to a level of exper-
tise which they are probably not prepared to assume. More sig-
nificantly, the form of liability announced in Clements precludes
contractual limits of liability. If this decision is widely followed,
it may stifle the beneficial application of data processing tech-
niques to as yet unexamined problems in the business community
by placing the entire risk of failure on the service bureau operator.
This comment will study the problems presented by Clem-
ents and the small group of pertinent computer industry cases
to date, and suggest how California can be expected to rule on
the same issues. First, it will show that California could easily
extend its own definition of fraud to encompass the innocent mis-
representation that made Service Bureau Corporation (SBC)9 lia-
ble in Clements. Second, it will discuss how facts which support
a finding of liability for innocent misrepresentation will also tend
to substantiate a cause of action based on implied warranty. Fur-
thermore, it will demonstrate why implied warranty is the prefera-
15, 1970, at 41; Chu, Buying Customized Computer Services, 19 BUSINESS
AUTOMATION, Mar. 1972, at 30, 34.
7. Wessel, Problems of Liability for the EDP Services lndustry, 19 CoM-
PUTERS & AUTOMATION, Sept. 1970, at 18 [hereinafter cited as Wessel]. See
also McNulty, Law and the New Machine Age: Drafting the Computer Serv-
ice Agreement, 52 Cm. B. REC. 275 (1971) [hereinafter cited as McNulty];
Landy, supra note 4; Young, The Computer and the Contract, 17 DATAMATION,
Nov. 1, 1971, at 22; 12 JURIMETRICS JOURNAL 190 (1972), which notes the
formation of a lawyer group to discuss inter alia service bureau liability; Fen-
wick, Marketing EDP Services-Reviewing the Legal Considerations, 5 LAW
& COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 75, 83 (1972).
8. 444 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'g modified 298 F. Supp. 115 (D.
Minn. 1969). The district court opinion is discussed by Boonin, Who Should
Pay For "Risk of Revolution" in New Technologies?, 75 CASE & COMMENT,
Dec. 1970, at 38. See also Carley, Computer Companies Are Hauled into
Court by Flurry of Lawsuits, 3 LAW & COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 286 (1970);
Duggan, A Case Digest: Suit for Damages in U.S. Data Processing Case, 3
LAW & COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 95 (1970); Tachna, What if Computers Don't
Compute and Data Processing Doesn't Process?, 45 CALIF. S.B.J. 333 (1970);
Wessel, Electronic Data Processing Services-Industry Liability Problems of the
1970's, 3 LAW & COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 225 (1970); Comment, Commercial
Law: Disclaimer and Limitation of Liability Clauses Denied Effect in Tort Ac-
tion for Non-intentional Misrepresentation, 54 MINN. L. REV. 846 (1970).
9. Service Bureau Corporation will be referred to hereinafter as SBC.
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ble legal theory upon which to base computer service bureau lia-
bility. A brief analysis of the applicability of products liability
and negligence theory to data processing situations is included.
Finally, the author will suggest how a proliferation of Clements-
like situations may be forestalled in California.
THE PROBLEM-CLEMENTS AUTO COMPANY
The facts involved in Clements Auto Company v. Service
Bureau Corporation'° are not atypical of the computer service
bureau industry's relationship with its clients.11 A data process-
ing salesman approaches a company and suggests that his firm's
service can solve the company's management problem; contracts
are signed providing for the performance of specific calculating,
summarizing, decisionmaking or reporting services. The spe-
cific services are performed in accordance with the contracts, but
the company's management problem remains unsolved. Not sur-
prisingly, the customer feels shortchanged-he has paid for a so-
lution; that was his only reason for entering into the contracts.
However, the service bureau believes that it has done exactly what
contracted to do-provide specific services.
In Clements, the plaintiff operated four wholesale supply
houses in Minnesota and Wisconsin. In 1962, Clements sought
and SBC proposed to perform data processing services which
would eventually make possible computerized inventory control of
warehouse merchandise. 12  Clements negotiated three series of
contracts which obligated SBC to produce specified accounting
and inventory status reports in a special format which were de-
signed to provide Clements with the desired information. How-
ever, the contracts did not specifically obligate SBC to "control"
Clements' inventory.'" SBC wrote the requisite computer pro-
grams, 4 produced the reports that were contracted for,' 5 and
made modifications to the programs in order to increase the use-
fulness of the reports.' 6 Thus, according to SBC, it performed its
10. 444 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1971), modifying 298 F. Supp. 115 (D. Minn.
1969).
11. The writer of this comment has nine years of experience in service
bureau management. His research is confirmed by his own experience.
12. SBC "did not promise or guarantee that [Clements] would receive in-
ventory control reports the first year". Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau
Corp., 298 F. Supp. 115, 121 (D. Minn. 1969).
13. Id. at 140.
14. Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169, 174 (8th
Cir. 1971).
15. Id.




contractual obligations diligently at a considerable loss on the con-
tracts.17
Viewed from Clements' position, however, the facts take on
a different coloration. In 1961, Clements became familiar with
an SBC product that "provided excellent control"18 of Clements'
subsidiary's inventory. A year later, Clements proposed that 'SBC
provide a "similar data processing system"' 9 for Clements' whole-
sale supply houses; SBC indicated that it could do so. However,
whatever SBC's system may have accomplished, it did not provide
the inventory control that SBC repeatedly asserted it would. Fi-
nally, Clements sued on alternative theories of (1) misrepresenta-
tion, (2) breach of implied warranty, (3) contract reformation, °
and (4) rescission or breach of contract.2
SOLUTION 1-FRAUD AND DECEIT
Relying on a theory of misrepresentation, the trial court in
Clements awarded the plaintiff damages amounting to substan-
tially all of its out of pocket costs for nearly the entire duration
of the contract period. 22  The alternative theories of recovery
were held either not to be maintainable on the facts2 or to add
nothing to the recovery.24 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed on the liability issue but reduced the damages on the
ground that the plaintiff's duty to mitigate arose earlier than had
been determined by the trial court.25
Whereas the district court had focused its attention on spe-
cific misrepresentations,26 the court of appeals concentrated on
the "one central actionable misrepresentation . .. that the pro-
17. Id., at 132, n. 13. The trial court notes that SBC lost $115,000 in
performing the contracts, and that while there were breaches of contract, one
involved "relatively minor errors". Id. at 140. The other two, id. at 124, 140,
may be ignored in the light of the circuit court's finding that the duty to miti-
gate arose before they occurred. 444 F.2d 169, 186 (D. Minn. 1971).
18. Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 298 F. Supp. 115, 120
(D. Minn. 1969).
19. Id.
20. Compare Security Leasing Co. v. Flinco, Inc., 23 U.2d 242, 461 P.2d
460 (1969), discussed in the text accompanying note 147 infra, where reforma-
tion succeeded, with Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 298 F. Supp.
115, 139 (D. Minn. 1969).
21. Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169, 174 (8th
Cir. 1971), 298 F. Supp. 115, 139 (D. Minn. 1969).
22. Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 298 F. Supp. 115, 132-42
(D. Minn. 1969).
23. Id. at 139, impolied warranty, reformation and rescission.
24. Id. at 140, breach of contract.
25. Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169, 186 (8th
Cir. 1971).
26. Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 298 F. Supp. 115, 125-131
(D. Minn. 1969).
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posed data processing system would, when fully implemented, be
capable of providing [Clements] sufficient information in a form
such that when properly utilized, it would constitute an effective
and efficient tool to be used in inventory control. '2 7  However,
both the district court and the court of appeals made it clear that
they were relying on the Minnesota tort of innocent misrepre-
sentation.28  A comparison of current California tort law reveals
that a similar result would be likely there.
The California Law of Fraud and Deceit
Two separate areas of the California Civil Code state the
law of tortious misrepresentation.29 The two code sections which
are particularly applicable to a situation in which a proposal to
perform data processing services is made in good faith are sec-
tions 157230 and 1710.81 These two sections have been held to
be interchangeable and the same rules of law apply to both.32
The elements of tortious misrepresentation in California are:
[1] "that a material misrepresentation was made;
27. Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169, 175 (8th
Cir. 1971).
28. The elements of fraud in Minnesota are: "1. There must be a repre-
sentation; 2. That representation must be false; 3. It must have to do with a
past or present fact; 4. That fact must be material; 5. It must be susceptible
of knowledge; 6. The representer must know it to be false, or in the alterna-
tive, must assert it as of his own knowledge without knowing whether it is
true or false; 7. The representer must intend to have the other person induced
to act, or justified in acting upon it; 8. That person must be so induced to act
or so justified in acting; 9. That person's action must be in reliance upon the
representation; 10. That person must suffer damage; 11. That damage must be
attributable to the misrepresentation, that is, the statement must be the proxi-
mate cause of the injury." Id. Compare these with the requisite elements
in California, which are given in the text accompanying note 33, infra.
29. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1571-1574 (fraud); §§ 1709-1711 (deceit) (West
1971).
30. "Actual fraud ...consists in . .. ihe positive assertion, in a man-
ner not warranted by the information of the person making it, of that which
is not true, though he believes it to be true ... [or] [t]he suppression of that
which is true, by one having knowledge or belief of the fact ....... Id.
§ 1572.
31. "Deceit ... is either: ... [t]he assertion, as a fact, of that which
is not true, by one who has no reasonable ground for believing it to be true
...[or] [tihe suppression of a fact, by one who is bound to disclose it, or who
gives information of other facts which are likely to mislead for want of com-
munication of that fact . . . . " Id. § 1710. Sections 1572(1), (4) and (5)
and 1710(1) and (4) apply where the representer is not acting in good faith
and would require proof of belief or intent not to carry out promises. Sec-
tion 1573, constructive fraud, applies where there is a breach of a fiduciary re-
lationship, without fraudulent intent. There might be situations where section
1573 would be useful, e.g., where a data processing system was recommended
by a CPA firm.
32. Stone v. Farnell, 239 F.2d 750, 754 (9th Cir. 1956); Sixta v. Ochsner,
187 Cal. App. 2d 485, 490, 9 Cal. Rptr. 617, 620 (1960).
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[2] that it was false;[3] that the defendants knew it to be untrue or did not have
sufficient knowledge to Warrant a belief that it was true;[4] that it was made with an intent to induce plaintiff to act
in reliance thereon;
[5] that plaintiff reasonably believed it to be true;
[6] that it was relied on by plaintiff;
[7] and that plaintiff suffered damage thereby."'s8
These elements agree generally with the elements under Minne-
sota law,3 4 leaving in dispute (1) to what extent the defendant
must be aware of the falsity of his representations, (2) whether
material representations include statements of opinion or intention
as well as representations of past or present fact, (3) what justi-
fies reliance by the plaintiff, (4) the proper measure of damages,
and (5) the duty to mitigate.3 8
Scienter
California law remains somewhat unsettled as to whether or
not scienter-the representer's knowledge of the falsity of his rep-
resentations-is required for proof of fraud. A recent case,
Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 6 states unequivocally that
scienter is an essential element of fraud, but dictum in A. Teichert
& Son, Inc. v. State7 maintains that misrepresentation may be in-
nocent as well as fraudulent.
Gagne v. Bertran,3" a 1954 California Supreme Court case,
seemingly put the issue to rest.39  In that case, plaintiff hired
Bertran to perform soil tests on a lot which he planned to buy for
an apartment building site. Defendant performed the tests and
informed plaintiff that there was no more than 16 inches of soil
fill; in fact there was significantly more. In reliance on the de-
fendant's report plaintiff purchased the lot. He subsequently had
to spend substantially more on the foundation than he had
33. Berven Carpets Corp. v. Davis, 210 Cal. App. 2d 206, 210, 26 Cal.Rptr. 513, 516 (1962), following Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal. 2d
412, 422, 159 P.2d 958, 964 (1945).
34. Cf. note 28, supra. Elements 1, 2, 4, 7, 9, 10, and 11 under Minne-
sota law are in accord with elements 1, 2, 4, 6, and 7 in California.
35. See elements 3, 5, 6, and 8 in note 28 supra.
36. 266 Cal. App. 2d 362, 267, 72 Cal. Rptr. 157, 160 (1968); followingRobinson v. Robinson, 187 Cal. App. 2d 677, 681-2, 10 Cal. Rptr. 130, 133(1960). See also 2 B. WfrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Torts § 198, at1383 (7th ed. 1960), which cites Wishnick v. Frye, 111 Cal. App. 2d 926, 245P.2d 532 (1952) as authority. See the discussion accompanying notes 43-49,infra, criticizing that authority.
37. 238 Cal. App. 2d 736, 752, 48 Cal. Rptr. 225, 236 (1965).
38. 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954).
39. Accord, Stone v. Farnell, 239 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1956).
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planned because of the inaccurately reported filled subsoil condi-
tion. The California Supreme Court upheld the trial court in
finding deceit by the defendant." Justice Traynor emphasized
that, due to the defendant's negligently performed test sampling,
his assertions were "made without reasonable ground for believ-
ing"4 1 them to be true, and no more knowledge of falsity than
that was required to find liability. In a footnote, Justice Traynor
specifically declared that "statements in a number of cases, con-
trary to . . . the cases cited in the text, that scienter is an essential
element of every cause of action for deceit are erroneous and are
therefore disapproved."42
Gagne should have settled the issue except that Wishnick v.
Frye,4 3 one of the cases in the text of the Traynor opinion, holds
that scienter is a necessary element of fraud.44 Wishnick was not
expressly overruled. However, cases subsequent to Gagne have
not found the Wishnick inconsistency particularly bothersome.
Stowe v. Fritzie Hotels, Inc.45 supports Gagne and Stone v. Far-
nell 6 broadened the scope of the Gagne rationale to include sec-
tions 1572 and 1573 (fraud) as well as section 1710 (deceit).
Sixta v. Ochsner4 7 cites Stone with approval. Thus, despite some
questionable authority to the contrary,4 a substantial number of
cases hold that scienter is not required for a finding of fraud.49
There are three classes of actionable misrepresentations: in-
40. The court also found negligence on the part of the defendant. Gagne
is especially interesting with regard to data processing services because the find-
ing of deceit rests upon the negligent sampling technique. Many data processing
proposals are based upon a preliminary fact gathering which often proves to be
misleading. See, e.g., Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d
169, 182-83 (8th Cir. 1971), but note that the preliminary facts in that case
were furnished by Clements.
41. Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d at 488, 275 P.2d at 20.
42. Id. at 487, 275 P.2d at 20.
43. 111 Cal. App. 2d 926, 245 P.2d 532 (1952).
44. But see Stone v. Farnell, 239 F.2d 750, 754 (9th Cir. 1956), which
states that "the Wishnick decision is not the law of California."
45. 44 Cal. 2d 416, 282 P.2d 890 (1955).
46. 239 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1956).
47. 187 Cal. App. 2d 485, 9 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1967).
48. Wishnick v. Frye, 111 Cal. App. 2d 926, 245 P.2d 532 (1952); Robin-
son v. Robinson, 187 Cal. App. 2d 677, 10 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1960); Black v.
Shearson, Hammill & Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 362, 72 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1968); 2
B. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 198, at 1383 (7th ed.
1960). Had the disapproval of the scienter requirement been more forcefully
stated in Gagne, much confusion about this area of California law could have
been avoided. See, e.g., Strand v. Librascope, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 743, 755
n. 13 (D. Mich. 1961), where it is noted that California requires scienter but
that Gagne marks a tendency to ameliorate the requirement. See also note 51,
inf ra.
49. Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954); Stowe v.
Fritzie Hotels, Inc., 44 Cal. 2d 416, 282 P.2d 890 (1955); Stone v. Farnell,
239 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1956).
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tentional, negligent, and innocent.50 The Clements holding turns
on innocent misrepresentation51 and therefore imposes strict lia-
bility on the representer5 2 California clearly allows recovery for
intentional and negligent misrepresentation,5 3 as the statutes and
the Gagne line of cases indicate. However, California would
seem to go further, for in Gagne the court held that an expert's
"unequivocal statement necessarily implied that he knew facts thatjustified his statement,"54 thereby indirectly imposing strict liabil-
ity in fraud for innocent misrepresentation by experts.5 5 There-
fore, within narrow bounds, California courts appear willing to
label a seller's innocent misrepresentations fraudulent.
When Does Salesmanship Become Lying-
Fact versus Opinion
When bringing suit for fraud in California it is necessary to
distinguish between expressions of fact and expressions of opin-
ion. The law allows some room for "puffing"; a salesman may
make extravagant claims for his product provided they are under-
stood to be no more than hyperbole.56 Similarly, predictions of
50. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 713 (3rd ed. 1964).
51. "There is no proof that anyone at SBC knew this statement was false
when it was uttered, but deliberate deception or scienter is not a necessary ele-
ment .... ." Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 298 F. Supp.
115, 126 (D. Minn. 1969). "It is important to emphasize that, in Minnesota,
the element of scienter, or intent to deceive, or even recklessness, is not neces-
sary to actionable fraud." Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444
F.2d 169, 176 (8th Cir. 1971).
52. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 726 (3rd ed. 1964), does not include
California among the states which impose strict liability, but does cite Ed-
wards v. Sergi, 137 Cal. App. 369, 30 P.2d 541 (1934), as an example of
the fiction of presuming scienter, and notes a trend towards strict liability in
fraud.
53. Deceit involves a statement by one who has "no reasonable ground
for believing it to be true." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1710(2) (West 1971) (em-
phasis added). See also the text accompanying note 41, supra. Compare
with this the Minnesota standard: "of his own knowledge without knowing
whether it is true or false." See note 28, supra.
54. 43 Cal. 2d 481, 489, 275 P.2d 15, 21 (1954).
55. The presumption of knowledge was used to support a fraud cause of
action in Edwards v. Sergi, 137 Cal. App. 369, 30 P.2d 541 (1934), which
involved the sale of land by an agent who innocently asserted that it con-
tained a wooded section when it did not. See also the text accompanying
notes 66-72, infra.
56. Lathrop v. National Sugar Co., 16 Cal. App. 350, 116 P. 982 (1911),
holds that some puffing is permissible. See also Williams v. Lowenthal, 124
Cal. App. 179, 12 P.2d 75 (1932); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 739 (3rd ed.
1964) ("The 'puffing' rule amounts to a seller's privilege to lie his head off, so
long as he says nothing specific, on the theory that no reasonable man would
believe him . . ."). The question of what is puffing and what is fraud is one of
fact [CAL. CIv. CODE § 1574 (West 1971)] and allows the plaintiff to get to
the jury in any event. Herzog v. Capital Co., 27 Cal. 2d 349, 352, 164 P.2d
8, 9 (1945).
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product performance must be shown to infer assertions of past or
present fact to be actionable.57  In Clements, the specific repre-
sentations made by SBC were phrased in terms of what the sys-
tem would do when it was properly functioning at some time in
the future. 58 These assertions were made about a system which
was a present fact only in the sense that it was a present concep-
tion. Nevertheless, these representations were held to be more
than mere predictions. The court in Clements found that the
proposed system was a product,59 notwithstanding the fact that it
was clearly not an off-the-shelf item and might never exist in a
tangible state unless Clements signed the contracts. 60  Treating
the concept of a system as a finished product made it possible to
treat descriptions of its proposed characteristics as statements of
fact rather than design objectives.
Because no California court has yet dealt in detail with the
special problems of representations associated with the sale of un-
tested data processing systems, the search for a rule of law must
necessarily proceed by analogy.6' There are cases which discuss
representations about anticipated product performance; if a data
processing system is a product, then these cases are useful ana-
57. "[Plredictions as to future events are ordinarily regarded as nonaction-
able .... ." Zeh v. Alameda Community Hotel Corp., 122 Cal. App. 366, 368,
10 P.2d 190, 191 (1932). Accord, Connelly v. State, 3 Cal. App. 3d 744, 759,
84 Cal. Rptr. 257, 267 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
58. The language in question is "the only way [Clements] would ever get",
Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 298 F. Supp. 115, 125 (D. Minn.
1969); "program will provide", id. at 127; "no additional personnel would be
required", id. at 128; "would allow", id. at 130; "it would constitute", id.
(emphasis added).
59. "We believe the trial court was correct in finding that the representa-
tions as a whole were more than mere predictions....
We have previously stated the central representation to be 'that the pro-
posed data processing system would, when fully implemented, be capable of
providing [Clements] sufficient information in a form such that when properly
utilized, it would constitute an effective and efficient tool to be used in inven-
tory control.' While this statement is in a sense a prediction of what the sys-
tem will do, it is also, under existing Minnesota law, a statement of the in-
herent capabilities of a particular product." Clements Auto Co. v. Service
Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169, 181 (8th Cir. 1971).
60. One of the contracts signed by Clements "provided for the program-
ming necessary to produce the reports." Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau
Corp., 298 F. Supp. 115, 121 (D. Minn. 1969). The computer that was
going to make the system possible had not yet been delivered to SBC's offices
at the time the proposals were presented.
61. "Until there is a large volume of decided cases on the new mechanisms,
decisions in cases involving them will be made by drawing analogies to osten-
sibly comparable situations in other fields." Freed, Some Legal Aspects of
Computer Use in Business and Industry, 12 JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ENGINEER-
ING 289, 290 (1961). "The most feasible solution therefore appears to be to
examine the law in closely related areas and try to reason by analogy to com-
puters wherever possible." Banzhaf, When a Computer Needs a Lawyer, 71
DICKINSON LAw REv. 240, 241 (1967).
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logues. Ordinarily, where prior experience is definitely lacking62
or where the court wishes to ignore it,68 predictions of future per-
formance are dismissed as mere opinion; however, where a product
which is not new is put to new uses, California regards statements
of predicted performance in those untried uses as statements of
fact. For example, in Kolberg v. Sherwin-Williams Co. 4 the
plaintiff bought an insecticide spray from the defendant, relying
on the defendant's assertions that it would kill scale without dam-
aging his orange trees or crop. However, use of the spray resulted
in substantial damage to plaintiff's orange crop. The plaintiff
sued and won on a fraud theory by showing that the defendant
knew of previous instances of defoliation resulting from the use
of the spray. Thus, because the defendant knew of risks asso-
ciated with his product's use, his representation that the spray
could be used safely in plaintiff's circumstances was actionable.
Similarly, in Cornell Tractor Co. v. Humphrey,6" a case involv-
ing a harvester which did not harvest grain as fast as the seller
had indicated it would, the plaintiff buyer succeeded on a fraud
theory. From these precedents it is clear that, to the extent that
a proposed system may be treated as a product, the seller's pre-
dictions about its potential are actionable where the seller knows
how his product has worked previously in similar situations.
Expertise: Salesmanship in Disguise
The seller cannot always be shown to have specific knowl-
edge of adverse results in prior situations. For that reason, an-
other line of analogous cases bases liability on the expertise of the
representer. For example, Barron Estate Co. v. Woodruff Co.66
involved an architect who represented to his client that the total
construction cost of the designed building would not exceed $300,
000. On the basis of that estimate, the architect was retained to
make the necessary plans at a retainer of 15% of each week's
cost of construction. After construction costs surpassed the $300,
62. Finch v. Mcee, 18 Cal. App. 2d 90, 62 P.2d 1380 (1936) (represen-
tation that a house was earthquake proof).
63. Henry v. Continental Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 156 Cal. 667, 105 P. 960(1909) (representation that an investment "system" would make money in 7
years).
64. 93 Cal. App. 609, 269 P. 975 (1928).
65. 107 Cal. App. 434, 290 P. 486 (1930). "The machine did not harvest
but 270 sacks per day, whereas it was represented that it would harvest 800
sacks per day. . . . It requires no citation of authority to the effect that the
alleged misrepresentations were actionable." Id. at 436, 290 P. at 487. Cf.
the claims that SBC made for the capacity of the Flexowriters. Clements Auto
Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 298 F. Supp. 115, 128-29 (D. Minn. 1969).
66. 163 Cal. 561, 126 P. 351 (1912), approved by Gagne v. Bertran, 43
Cal. 2d 481, 489, 275 P.2d 15, 21 (1954).
1972]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
000 limit and it became obvious that there would be a great deal
of additional expense required, the client sued on the basis of
fraud. The Supreme Court of California held that the plaintiff
properly relied on the architect's cost estimate because it was a
representation of fact and, moreover, because the architect's su-
perior knowledge and skill justified such reliance."' Thus, where
the seller makes predictions which are within the scope of his
own specific field of expertise, such predictions become actionable
as statements of fact.
The distinction between statements of fact on the one hand
and predictions or opinions on the other depends largely on the
relative degree of expertise between the parties. For example,
in Bank of America v. Hutchinson, 8 the bank's branch manager
vouched for the credit of one of the bank's depositers to a third
party. On the basis of this information the third party made a
loan to the depositer in question which was subsequently found
to be uncollectible. Although no fiduciary relationship between
the bank and the lender was found, the court held the bank liable
for its employee's misrepresentations. The rule of Hutchinson
is, therefore, that a cause of action for fraud can be maintained
where an unsubstantiated opinion is offered by a representer who
is in possession of superior knowledge. Thus, if an expert speaks
at all, he must speak truthfully.
The expertise differential may likewise be augmented by
buyer ignorance and gullibility. For example, in Harazim v. Ly-
nam 9 the defendants ran a confidence game which took the form
of an instructional course in the "science of money," representing
among other things that President Kennedy had been a member.
The object of this scheme was to get the course enrollees to turn
over money for "investment" purposes. In reversing the trial
court's dismissal the court of appeals held that the plaintiff's gulli-
bility, as well as the defendant's superior knowledge, can be a
determinative factor in a finding of fraud.
However, the balance of knowledge between the parties may
also tilt in the defendant's favor. One recent case 70 denied re-
67. 163 Cal. at 572, 126 P. at 356. Cf. Clements Auto Co. v. Service
Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169, 184 (8th Cir. 1971) regarding "statements upon
which [Clements], with its limited knowledge of computers and data process-
ing systems, could reasonably rely, given the superior knowledge of SBC."
68. 212 Cal. App. 2d 142, 27 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1963). See also Custodio v.
Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967), where a misrepresenta-
tion cause of action was sustained against a doctor who represented that a
sterilization operation on a woman would work when he knew of instances to
the contrary. The woman subsequently became pregnant.
69. 267 Cal. App. 2d 127, 72 Cal. Rptr. 670 (1968). Accord, Seeger v.
Odell, 18 Cal. 2d 409, 115 P.2d 977 (1941).
70. Pacesetter Homes, Inc. v. Brodkin, 5 Cal. App. 3d 206, 85 Cal. Rptr.
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covery to a plaintiff who invested in a duplex on the basis of the
defendant builder's claims as to rental value. The court ruled
that the defendant's estimates of rental value did not justify plain-
tiffs reliance because the builder had no experience in renting
duplexes and both parties had comparable knowledge in real es-
tate matters.
A case which involved an innocent misrepresentation in the
sale of computer components also rested its decision on the rela-
tive expertise of the parties. In Strand v. Librascope, Inc.,71 the
expertise differential was at first glance insubstantial, but because
of the rapid development then taking place in the state of the art,
the court held that the seller's superior knowledge of the product
involved required full disclosure. Plaintiff Strand bought mag-
netic reading and recording devices from the defendant for use in
a computer that he was building. The defendant not only failed
to inform Strand of an improved version of the devices, but also
failed to disclose the troubles that it was having in its own use of
the devices, and the necessary modifications needed to make them
function. Although both parties were pioneers in a very special-
ized area of technology, the court found that "[t]he transaction
entered into between Librascope and Strand did not thus present
the classic common-law situation of parties 'bargaining at arms
length' ", because "[i]n the area of electronic digital computers
[in 1961], research and development [were] advancing at an almost
unbelievable pace."72  Thus, on the frontiers of knowledge, where
experimentation is still taking place, those who are perhaps only
days ahead may be liable for their statements. The rapid discovery
and development of new uses for data processing often gives the
"expert" data processor only slightly more knowledge about the
difficulties inherent in a particular application of data processing
techniques to a customer's problems than the cutomer himself has,
and yet that slight advantage is apparently enough to make him
liable for his prognoses of product performance.
California is on the verge of imposing a rule of innocent
misrepresentation on experts. Cases such as Barron Estate Co.
and Strand illustrate how courts have made the disparity of knowl-
edge between the seller and the buyer a basis for treating asser-
tions about future performance as statements of fact in order to
find fraud. Data processing skill is clearly a species of expertise
39 (1970). This case would be useful in defeating the fraud claim of a service
bureau against a software firm, if both parties had an equal degree of expertise
in the subject area.
71. 197 F. Supp. 743 (D. Mich. 1961), Michigan law governing (Michigan,
like Minnesota, allows innocent misrepresentation causes of action).
72. 197 F. Supp. at 752.
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and cases such as Gagne hold such expertise a basis for strict lia-
bility. Thus, there is a strong likelihood that statements similar
to SBC's in Clements will incur fraud liability in California. As-
suming that liability is imposed, it is probable that damages will
be greater than under Minnesota law.
The Measure of Damages under a Fraud Theory
The trial court in Clements awarded damages equal to sub-
stantially all of Clements' out of pocket expenses attributable to
the fraud, including sums for clerical costs, increased supplies re-
quired, executive salaries, and losses due to distressed inventory
as well as the sums outlayed to SBC and the equipment lessor.
71
The court held, furthermore, that no duty to mitigate arose until
some three years after the service contracts were negotiated 74 be-
cause Clements was justified in relying on SBC's continuing as-
surances that the system would work after certain recommended
improvements were made.75 Had this holding withstood attack
on appeal, it would have had dramatic consequences for the ser-
vice bureau industry by making data processors liable for all losses
incurred while the data processor and his customer worked jointly
to improve the system. Service bureaus would understandably
become reluctant to bear strict liability for customer losses attrib-
utable to working the "bugs" out of the system, particularly when
all of the benefits would flow to the customer.
On appeal, SBC vigorously argued that the limit of liability
provisions in the contracts between the parties should govern in
a case of innocent misrepresentation just as they would for breach
of contract. 76  Had this argument prevailed, there would be too
little constraint on service bureau claims of system performance;
a service bureau would be able to minimize its risk of damages
without expressly specifying for which of those assertions of qual-
ity it was limiting its damages. The Eighth Circuit held, how-
ever, that the issue was controlled by Minnesota tort law and
73. Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 298 F. Supp. 115, 142
(D. Minn. 1969). Looking at the results from SBC's viewpoint, SBC was
liable for $480,811.33, id. at 142, on a gross sale of $216,596.90, id. at 215,
which represented a net loss even without the damage award, id. at 132 n. 13.
The "[tirial [clourt's award . . . [turned] . . . three years of loss into years
of profit of over $100,000 per year at SBC's expense." SBC's Appellant's Brief
at 51, Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169 (8th Cir.
1971). A copy of Appellant's Brief is on file in the office of the SANTA
CLARA LAwYER [hereinafter cited as Appellant's Brief].
74. Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 298 F. Supp. 115, 138 (D.
Minn. 1969).
75. Id. at 137.
76. Appellant's Brief, supra note 73, at 45.
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hence any contractual limit of liability was inapplicable, even
where the misrepresentations were innocent." Thus, the service
bureau in Minnesota has no means by which it can minimize its
risk other than exercising extreme caution when moving into new
areas of data processing services.
SBC also contended that Clements was obligated to refuse of-
fered services once it determined that the system was not func-
tioning as it had anticipated. 78  However, the Eighth Circuit held
that the duty to mitigate arose not at the first sign of error nor
after an excessive experience of failure, but only after Clements
and SBC had made a reasonable effort to make the system per-
form to the customer's satisfaction.7' This ruling, therefore, takes
a pragmatic approach to the mitigation problem by allowing data
processors to attempt to apply their techniques to new problems
without bearing the risk of unlimited liability should failure ulti-
mately result.
The circuit court also brushed aside SBC's attempt to re-
quire evidence as to the cost of pre-computer inventory methods"0
on the ground that the trial court was "allowed considerable lee-
way in arriving at the amount of damages.""' This refusal to in-
sist on proof of pre-service bureau costs is unfortunate because all
too often the costs before data processing consist of the largely
invisible part-time efforts of a number of clerical personnel, which
could easily escape the court's attention, while the costs of data
processing are evidenced by a highly visible monthly bill.
California statutory law on the subject of damages for fraud
likewise follows the "out of pocket rule." Civil Code § 3343,2
which states the rule of damage recovery for actions in fraud,
awards the difference between what the defrauded party has ex-
pended and what he has received in value, plus additional dam-
ages arising from the transaction.8" Section 3343 clearly allows
77. Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169, 188 (8th
Cir. 1971).
78. Appellant's Brief, supra note 73, at 47.
79. Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169, 185 (8th
Cir. 1971).
80. Appellant's Brief, supra note 73, at 49.81. Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169, 190 (8th
Cir. 1971). It cut the award to $247,745.17. Id. at 191.
82. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3343 (West 1971).
83. Id. It is difficult to see the distinction between this section and section
3333 covering tort in general, and the Supreme Court of California apparently
shares in the confusion. In Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 490, 275 P.2d15, 22 (1954), the majority cites section 3333, but, as pointed out by the dis-
sent, actually applies section 3343. For the rule that, Gagne v. Bertran not-
withstanding, section 3343 applies in cases of fraud, see Garrett v. Perry, 53Cal. 2d 178, 346 P.2d 758 (1959); Sixta v. Ochsner, 187 Cal. App. 2d 485, 9 Cal.
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consequential damages,84 and if intent to defraud can be shown,
exemplary damages can be awarded. 5
The primary statutory measure of damages for fraud is clear,
but three secondary factors cloud the picture. The first of these
is the "benefit of the bargain" measure of damages 6 which would
be applicable to fraud8 7 in sales covered by the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. 8 The second is the lessening, in recent cases, of
the inflexibility of the rule limiting damages to "out of pocket" loss-
es.89 Coleman v. Ladd Ford Co.90 declared the existence of ex-
ceptions to the exclusive measure of damages decreed by section
3343 and the rationale of Coleman is sweeping enough to reach
many other cases. 91 Finally, the third factor tending to amelio-
rate the impact of section 3343 is the courts' liberality in applying
it. Examples are Lawson v. Town & Country Shops, Inc.,92
where punitive damages were awarded under section 3343, and
Sixta v. Ochsner98 which misread Lawson as allowing recovery of
loss of profits and held that any loss arising from the transaction
is recoverable.9 4
The Duty to Mitigate
Mitigation of damages may not be stringently required of
the defrauded party in all cases. For example, in Gagne, where
Rptr. 617 (1960); Lawson v. Town & Country Shops, Inc., 159 Cal. App. 2d
196, 323 P.2d 843 (1958); Nathanson v. Murphy, 132 Cal. App. 2d 363, 282
P.2d 174 (1955); Bagdasarian v. Gragnon, 31 Cal. 2d 744, 192 P.2d 935
(1948).
84. Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 490, 275 P.2d 15, 22 (1954);
Bagdasarian v. Gragnon, 31 Cal. 2d 744, 762, 192 P.2d 935, 946 (1948).
85. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1971). In Brockway v. Heilman, 250
Cal. App. 2d 807, 58 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1967), the defendant sold a bar and prom-
ised to deliver a liquor license, which he had no intent of doing. $5,000
exemplary damages were awarded.
86. CAL. COMM. CODE § 2721 (West 1971). The California annotation
to section 2721 indicates that it would change the measure of damages to the
more generous standard applicable to breach of contract.
87. "Remedies for material misrepresentation or fraud include all remedies
available under this Article for non-fraudulent breach." Id. (emphasis sup-
plied). The disjunction of "material misrepresentation" and "fraud" suggests
that applicability to innocent as well as fraudulent misrepresentation might be
intended. See also Note, Fraud: Measure of Damages, 11 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
876, 883 (1964).
88. See notes 118-33 and accompanying text, infra, for an analysis of to
what degree a service bureau's activities are subject to the Uniform Commercial
COde.
89. See generally Note, Fraud: Measure of Damages, 11 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
876 (1964).
90. 215 Cal. App. 2d 90, 29 Cal. Rptr. 832 (1963).
91. Accord, Note, Fraud: Measure of Damages, 11 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 876, 882
(1964).
92. 159 Cal. App. 2d 196, 323 P.2d 843 (1958).
93. 187 Cal. App. 2d 485, 9 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1960).
94. Id. at 491, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
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property was purchased for an apartment building in reliance up-
on soil tests, it was held unreasonable to require the purchaser to
cease construction in order to mitigate damages. 5 Moreover, au-
thority exists for the proposition that where the seller has superior
knowledge a defrauded buyer is not prevented from maintaining
an action because he abandoned his investigation of the facts after
his suspicions were aroused. 6 Thus, although the court's reason-
ing in Clements that the plaintiff was not entitled to rely on SBC's
representations after it became apparent that they were false is
persuasive, it could be argued that the inextricable involvement
of the data processing system in the customer's business consid-
erably prolonged justifiable reliance. In any event, reliance would
not be negated by mere suspicion of falsity.9 7
The measure of damages for fraud in California is at least as
generous as that applied in Clements and the trend in California
is towards greater generosity. Likewise, California is no less lib-
eral than the Clements court in allowing the plaintiff to prolong
reliance and delay mitigation.9" In short, Clements would have
fared as well if not better in California. However, beyond the
generosity of California courts there lies a sounder basis for an-
ticipating an increased measure of damages for fraud in data
processing cases. The Clements trial court perceived the great
dependence on data processing services that the user quickly de-
velops.99 This dependence makes it very difficult for the user to
95. Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954).
96. Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal. 2d 412, 435, 159 P.2d 958, 971
(1945).
97. Id. The general rule is that suspicion should give rise to investigation
[Hayward Union High School Dist. v. Madrid, 234 Cal. App. 2d 100, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 268 (1965); Carpenter v. Hamilton, 18 Cal. App. 2d 69, 62 P.2d 1397
(1936)], but that negligent investigation will not bar the plaintiff's recovery.
Seeger v. Odell, 18 Cal. 2d 409, 115 P.2d 977 (1941); Meyer v. Ford Motor
Co., 275 Cal. App. 2d 90, 79 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1969).
98. Compare Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal. 2d 412, 435, 159 P.2d
958, 971 (1945) with Perkins v. Meyerton, 190 Minn. 542, 251 N.W. 559, 560
(1934).
99. "Furthermore, the representations made by SBC were not ones which
the ordinary laymen eventually could easily determine to be true or false.
SBC presented to [Clements] new techniques involving a new technology and
a new language. This system was represented to have the potential for great
benefit to those who used it. It was to permit the managers of this business
to retrieve and compare information about their business with a degree of ac-
curacy and at a speed which was unheard of before the computer was de-
veloped. But this system also had a potential for great harm to those who
adopted it, when the system was improperly designed. This businessman,
who decided to automate his accounts receivable and attempted by that to ob-
tain the information necessary for inventory control, took a step down a path
from which there was no turning back without great cost. He abandoned his
previous accounting system. He discarded his old method of inventory control.
His whole business was wrapped around a spool of magnetic tape which was
not in his possession and was not even his property. To the extent that the
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abandon even faulty data processing systems and revert to manual
methods. The circuit court relied upon Minnesota precedents'"°
which it interpreted as cutting off justified reliance after discovery
of signs of fraud and for that reason reduced damages. However,
the court's ruling' 0 pointedly ignores the presence in that au-
thority of justification for not requiring mitigation in certain
situations."' The trial court's findings of fact'03 indicate that
Clements' "discovery" of the fraud, on the date that the circuit court
holds that justifiable reliance ended, was mere suspicion. Further-
more, a finding of seller expertise which justified Clements' reliance
on SBC's representations in the first place should provide a basis for
continuing reliance on assurances that the system would work as
soon as the "bugs" were worked out. These considerations in con-
cert-the generosity of California law on fraud damages, the un-
availability of contractual limitations of liability, and the extreme
dependence inherent in reliance upon data processing services-
would tend to result in unjustifiably large damage awards.
Excessively large damage awards could have a crippling ef-
fect on the fledgling data processing services industry. The cir-
cuit court in Clements probably recognized this because it resorted
to a strict concept of justifiable reliance which does not accord
with the facts in order to avoid too large a damage award. If
California courts rely on fraud as a basis for imposing liability
in similar cases, they too may be forced into being overly restric-
tive in determining where justifiable reliance ends and the duty
to mitigate starts. For that reason, it is desirable that a basis of
liability be recognized that allows a contractual form of limitation.
It is evident that implied warranty will satisfy that goal.
SOLUTION 2-IMPLIED WARRANTY
The Nexus Between Fraud and Warranty
The concept of implied warranty developed from the tort of
information on that spool was inaccurate, he had no other means to retrieve it
or correct it." Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 298 F. Supp. 115,
137 (D. Minn. 1969).
100. Perkins v. Myerton, 190 Minn. 542, 251 N.W. 559 (1934); L'Evesque
v. Rognrud, 254 Minn. 55, 93 N.W.2d 672 (1958), cited by Clements Auto Co.
v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169, 184 (8th Cir. 1971).
101. Id.
102. The passage quoted at Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444
F.2d 169, 184 (8th Cir. 1971), to the effect that a defrauded party must
mitigate upon discovery of the fraud, concludes with the statement that the stated
rule is "not without limitations", Perkins v. Myerton, 190 Minn. 542, 251 N.W.
559, 560 (1934). Perkins also states that "the defrauded party is not required
to abandon [an ongoing business] in order to obtain relief." Id. at 561.




deceit; 04 however, it shows some of the characteristics of both
tort and contract law. 10 In California, actions for fraud or de-
ceit have become virtually interchangeable. 1 6 Had the scope of
fraud theory remained within its original bounds, actions for fraud
and deceit would lie for intentional misrepresentations while war-
ranty would lie for innocent ones. However, many jurisdictions
have extended the fraud concept to impose strict liability for inno-
cent misrepresentations. 107
In Clements SBC contended that finding liability for inno-
cent misrepresentations is tantamount to finding liability under
an implied warranty.0 8 SBC reasoned that the disclaimers of
implied warranties which were effective to bar a cause of action
for breach of an implied warranty' 0 9 should also have barred the
fraud cause of action because, in the face of such disclaimers,
Clements was no more justified in relying on the statements as
representations of fact than as warranties. However, the Eighth
Circuit rejected this contention and ruled that "a general disclaimer
clause is ineffective to negate reliance on even innocent misrepre-
sentations."' 0  If this position is adopted by other courts, data
processing services may not be able to contractually avoid liability
for statements of product quality except where those statements
are adjudged implied warranties.
California has statutorily extended fraud to cover misrepre-
sentations which are negligently made,"' and judicial construc-
tion has nearly resulted in recognition of strict liability for repre-
sentations made in conjunction with sales."' Because California
courts will not expressly impose liability for innocent misrepre-
sentations as a subspecies of fraud, they have not directly ruled on
the effect of a disclaimer on sincere but false claims that are not
found to be warranties. However, as discussed earlier,1" Cal-
ifornia courts could impose liability for fraud on a data processor
in SBC's position without acknowledging that it was basing its de-
cision on innocent misrepresentation. Since the same utterances
104. W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 651, 699, 700 (3rd ed. 1964).
105. Id. at 651-52.
106. Cases cited note 32, supra.
107. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 701, 724-29 (3rd ed. 1964).
108. "SBC contends that liability in Minnesota today for innocent misrepre-
sentation in a case involving the sale of either goods or services cannot exist in
the absence of a parallel finding of liability for breach of warranty." Appel-
lant's Brief, note 73, supra, at 29.
109. Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 298 F. Supp. 115, 139
(D. Minn. 1969).
110. Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169, 178 (8th
Cir. 1971).
111. See text accompanying notes 30, 31 and 38-49, supra.
112. See text accompanying notes 55-72, supra.
113. Id.
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frequently give rise to both fraud and breach of warranty causes
of action," 4 particularly in data processing cases, 1 5 there is a
strong likelihood that California courts will eventually have to
squarely face this issue. Furthermore, if the few computer in-
dustry cases to date are indicative of a trend, the unique require-
ments of data processing may provide opportunities to avoid dis-
claimer clauses.' 16
When the first Clements-like case arises in California, the
courts will have authority for finding liability on the basis of
either fraud or warranty, and will be in a position to decide the
case on the basis of public policy. Before the relative merits of
the two can be weighed, it is necessary to examine the nature and
extent of warranty liability.
The California Law of Warranty
The law with respect to goods. A common source of war-
ranty liability in California is that portion of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code governing sales which has been incorporated into
the California Commercial Code. 1' 7  Generally, these provisions
apply only to goods,1 8 not services, but it may not be assumed
114. See, e.g., Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954). See
generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 700-1, 707-8 (3rd ed. 1964).
115. Landy, supra note 4, at 139, indicates that there are three cases other
than Clements either decided or pending which include both fraud and warranty
causes of action.
116. See text accompanying notes 143-9, infra.
117. CAL. COMM. CODE §§ 2312-2317 (West 1971). Section 2312 covers
warranties of title and against infringement which would be of interest especially
in the sale of computer programs. Section 2313 provides that express warran-
ties are created by the seller's affirmation of fact or opinion, description of
goods, or sample or model, provided they are part of the basis of the bargain.
With regard to warranties that arise by virtue of advertising, see note 131
and accompanying text, infra. With regard to samples, it should be noted that
service bureaus frequently furnish sample reports as part of a proposal for data
processing services. And as to models, the flowcharts that are often placed in
formal proposals often bear little resemblance to the system being sold. Section
2314 deals with the implied warranties of merchantability and usage of trade
which would tend to impose a minimum level of quality on the service bureau.
Section 2315 deals with the implied warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose, which requires the seller to take into account the buyer's purpose in
choosing the product. Section 2316 allows all warranties to be excluded by
appropriate, conspicuous language in writing. However, in California disclaimer
clauses are to be construed strictly against the seller. Lindberg v. COutches,
167 Cal. App. 2d 828, 334 P.2d 701 (1959); Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co.,
42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954). Section 2317 states in what order
inconsistent warranties shall be considered. It is important to note that im-
plied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose may survive even contrary
express warranties in the form of a sample. Id. § 2317(c); L & N Sales Co.
v. Stuski, 188 Pa. Super. 117, 146 A.2d 154 (1958); Frigidinners, Inc. v. Branch-
town Gun Club, 176 Pa. Super. 643, 109 A.2d 202 (1954).
118. CAL. COMM. CODE § 2102 (West 1971).
1972] DATA PROCESSING SERVICES
that the activities of data processing services are thereby exclud-
ed. 119 Computer programs may be goods; 1 0 reports printed at a
remote location may be goods. 2 ' While the law is at best un-
certain, at least one California court has refused to dismiss a
cause of action which claimed that computer-produced reports
were goods under the Uniform Commercial Code.' 22 If data in
the form of a report may be subject to warranties, it seems only
logical to assume that the information contained on the surface
of a magnetic disk or tape may also come under the Uniform
Commercial Code's warranty provisions.' 23 If the data stored in
the service bureau's magnetic files bears warranties, then inaccu-
racies in printed reports will subject the service bureau operator to
liability unless he can demonstrate inaccuracy in the "input" in-
formation that he originally received from his customer. Having
guaranteed all the intermediate stages of information storage, the
operator can hardly deny responsibility for the end-product.
The law with respect to services. The other basis of liability
for implied warranties lies in the common law. 124  Twenty-five
years ago the California Supreme Court found a warranty-like
119. Freed, Computers and the Work of Lawyers, 76 CASE & COMMENT,
Aug. 1971, at 46-47, notes "[tihe true legal nature of the activities of suppliers
of software programs frequently has been mistaken. Suppliers of goods tend to
be considered to be rendering services."
120. See Freed, Liabilities of Software Suppliers, notes for a speech at the
Spring Joint Computer Conference, May 1971 [hereinafter cited as Freed,
Liabilities]. A copy of these notes is on file in the office of the SANTA CLARA
LAWYER. See aslo Bigelow, Contract Caveats, 16 DATAMATION, Sept. 15, 1971,
at 41.
121. Freed, Computers and the Work of Lawyers, 76 CASE & COMMENT,
Aug. 1971, at 50.
122. 15 DATAMATION, July 1969, at 115, which reports Southern California
Retailer's Credit Service Co. v. Statistical Tabulating Corp., (Superior Court,
Los Angeles County, Docket number 98690, March 1968), lists the contentions
of both parties, and states that in May 1969 the court denied motions to dis-
miss. Like many similar suits (see Landy, supra note 4) it may have been
settled. The article reports that the plaintiff customer of the service bureau
was relying on a definition of goods that would include computer printed re-
ports.
123. On the subject of warranties for data processing, see generally Freed,
Liabilities, supra note 120; Boonin, Who Should Pay for the "Risk of Revolu-
tion" in New Technologies, 75 CASE & COMMENT, Dec. 1970, at 38 (hard-
ware); Bigelow, Contract Caveats, 16 DATAMATION, Sept. 15, 1970, at 41
(software); R. BIGELOW, GUIDE TO NEGOTIATING A COMPUTER CONTRACT
(1969) (hardware); Bigelow, Some Legal Aspects of Commercial Remote Ac-
cess Computer Services, 15 DATAMATION, Aug. 1969, at 48 (data bank);
Spangenberg, supra note 5 (hardware); Freed, Some Legal Questions Confront-
ing Service Organizations, in R. FREED, MATERIALS AND CASES ON COMPUTERS
AND LAW I-AJ (1969) (service bureaus).
124. "For historical reasons warranties have become identified primarily
with transactions involving the sale or furnishing of tangible chattels . . . but
they are not confined to such transactions." Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481,
486, 275 P.2d 15, 19 (1954).
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obligation to warn of possible dangers in the sale of a service in
Dam v. Lake Aliso Riding School.'25 In that case a child was
thrown from a hired horse. The court held that the bailor of a
horse impliedly warrants that it does not have an especially vi-
cious temperament when it is offered for use in a riding class. This
implied duty to point out concealed unsuitability"2 6 has direct ap-
plication to a Clements situation.'27 Another useful exemplar is
the changing status of warranties in building construction. A
data processing service constructs a system of programs in much
the same way a building contractor constructs a building. Any
warranties that attach to a finished building, therefore, may be
relevant to data processing systems. For example, Kuitems v.
Covell'2 held that an implied warranty of fitness for an intended
use arose in a contract to install roofing material. Likewise,
Dow. v. Holly Mfg. Co.12 9 held a building contractor liable on an
implied warranty for his faulty installation of a heater. And the
court in Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack5 ° ruled that a warranty of mer-
chantability could be implied in a contract to install radiant heat
tubing. In all three cases, the contracts were for installation ser-
vices, and the finished product was held to carry a warranty that
the labor had been properly done. Although these cases involved
the installation of goods, the logical extension of their rationale
would create implied warranties where the goods installed were of
nominal value and the contract was primarily for services ren-
dered. Data processing systems tend to be just such composi-
tions.
The attractiveness of the implied warranty theory to the buy-
125. 6 Cal. 2d 395, 57 P.2d 1315 (1936). See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS
655 (3rd ed. 1964), where the author notes the "tendency to extend the strict
liability of an implied warranty beyond cases involving the sale of goods."
126. This implied duty was "not a warranty in that sense which insures
the suitableness of the horse", Dam v. Lake Aliso Riding School, 6 Cal. 2d
395, 400, 57 P.2d 1315, 1318 (1936). Recovery was denied in this case be-
cause the horse was found to be safe.
127. "This silence [about error proneness] ... in itself constitutes a repre-
sentation by SBC." Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 298 F. Supp.
115, 128 (D. Minn. 1969).
128. 104 Cal. App. 2d 482, 231 P.2d 552 (1951). "The contract here
under consideration involves a construction job and not a mere sale of roofing
material . . . [and includes an] . .. entirely reasonable obligation implied in all
contracts to the effect that the work performed 'shall be fit and proper for its
said intended use' ". id. at 485, 231 P.2d at 554.
129. 49 Cal. 2d 720, 321 P.2d 736 (1958).
130. 55 Cal. 2d 573, 360 P.2d 897, 12 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1961). "[W]e con-
clude that the contract is one for labor and material. There may nevertheless
be an implied warranty. . . . There is no justification for refusing to imply
a warranty of suitability for ordinary uses merely because an article is furnished
in connection with a construction contract rather than one of sale." Id. at
582-83, 360 P.2d at 902, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
[Vol. 13
DATA PROCESSING SERVICES
er of data processing services is that warranties can be implied by
advertising. 3' In light of the frequently extravagant claims about
software products,' 32 this could have a strong impact on the data
processing industry." 3
Evidently California is close to extending warranty to the
sale of services as well as goods. This wider ambit for warranty,
together with a broadened conception of what constitutes goods,
will provide a rationale by which the sale of data processing sys-
tems can be brought under the law of implied warranty. The
buyer will benefit from such a development, for it will tend to
ensure that he gets what he wants from the system. In addition,
the seller will benefit, because, if data processing systems are sub-
ject to implied warranties of fitness and merchantability, the rep-
resentations which will make the data processor liable will be sub-
ject to the other negotiated terms of the contract. Thus, a nego-
tiated disclaimer, for example, may determine the protection af-
forded the seller.
Escaping the Disclaimer
Commercial service bureau operators would be well advised
to consult the disclaimer guidelines set forth in California Com-
mercial Code § 2316 in order to exclude undesired contract war-
ranties.13 4  Apparently many do not."' However, even when
they comply with section 2316, there are means by which their
disclaimers can be avoided.
131. E.g., Lane v. C. A. Swanson & Sons, 130 Cal. App. 2d 210, 278 P.2d
723 (1955), held that the words "boned", "boneless", and "no bones" in an
ad warranted that there would be none. See also Thomas v. Olin Mathieson
Chemical Corp., 255 Cal. App. 2d 806, 63 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1967).
132. See, e.g., the advertisement in 17 DATAMATION, Aug. 15, 1971, at 57.
"Any existing data file may be converted into any user-defined format ....
(emphasis added).
133. Spangenberg, supra note 5, at 72, "The advertizing department now
makes most of the warranties that get involved in litigation." Cf. Bigelow,
Contract Caveats, 16 DATAMATION, Sept. 15, 1970, at 42.
134. McNulty, supra note 7; ASSOCIATION OF DATA PROCESSING SERVIc E
ORGANIZATIONS, REPORT OF CONTRACT ANALYSIS SURVEY 22 (1969), copy on
file in the office of the SANTA CLARA LAWYER [hereinafter cited as SURVEY].
With regard to contract precautions generally, see Yoo, Contracting Effectivelyfor Computer Software, 8 DATA MANAGEMENT, Nov. 1970, at 42 (software,
with a checklist); Bigelow, Contract Caveats, 16 DATAMATION, Sept. 15, 1970,
at 42; Freed, Get the Computer System You Want, 47 HARv. Bus. REV. 99
(1965) (checklist); R. BIGELOw, GUIDE TO NEGOTIATING A COMPUTER CON-
TRAcT (1969); Await, Contracts for Computers, in COMPUTERS AND THE LAW
119 (R. Bigelow ed. 1969); Banzhaf, When a Computer Needs a Lawyer, 71
DICKINSON LAW REV. 240 (1967).
135. See SURVEY, supra note 134. 14% of service bureaus do not use formal,
written contracts for data processing services, 23% do not use formal written
contracts for programming services, and 56% do not use formal, written con-
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First, the disclaimer may be voidable by reason of its uncon-
scionability. 138  Voiding the express disclaimers in the written
contract between the parties results in the creation of implied war-
ranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose by
operation of law.'1 7  Thus, where disclaimers in data processing
contracts are unconscionable, buyers of data processing services
will find themselves protected. Furthermore, since Clements sug-
gests that service bureau operators will be assumed to possess
superior technological expertise, it is probable that courts in the
future will be quick to find unequal bargaining power because of
the knowledge disparity between the local businessman and the
sophisticated purveyor of data processing services. 138
In addition to the unconscionability escape mechanism, Cal-
ifornia has a policy of construing disclaimers strictly against the
seller.13 9 In fact, this often appears to operate as a public policy
against disclaimers. A case in point is Burr v. Sherwin Williams
Co., ° where a shall quantity of weed killer was inadvertently
mixed into the insecticide which defendant sold to the plaintiff,
damaging the latter's cotton crop. The California Supreme Court
held that the disclaimer' 4 ' in the contract was effective to negate
an implied warranty of fitness for the particular purpose of killing
specified pests, but was not effective to negate the implied war-
ranty of merchantability as a pesticide. Thus, the court was able
to honor the disclaimer clause and still grant relief to the plaintiff
tracts for sale or lease of program packages. Furthermore, the tendency of
service bureaus is to copy each other's poorly written contracts, which may leave
them open to liability even when using a contract. Freed, Computers and
the Work of Lawyers, 76 CASE & COMMENT, Aug. 1971, at 46.
136. CAL. COMM. CODE § 2302, 2718(3) (West 1971). See, e.g., Vander-
mark v. Ford Motor Co.,-Cal. App. 2d-, 33 Cal. Rptr. 175, vacated on
other grounds 34 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1963). This is an earlier opinion in the liti-
gation which eventually resulted in the imposition of strict liability on auto-
mobile dealers for personal injury caused by car defects. Vandermark v. Ford
Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
137. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.,-Cal. App. 2d-, 33 Cal. Rptr. 175,
182 (1963).
138. Wessel, Computer Services and the Law, 17 BUSINESS AUTOMATION,
Nov. 1970, at 48, predicts increased issues of unconscionability in the future.
In this context it is worthy of note that the major suppliers in the computer
industry are reluctant to vary the terms of their contracts, Withington, Write
Your Own, 16 DATAMATION, Oct. 1, 1970, at 50. Cf. Bigelow, Contract
Caveats, 16 DATAMATION, Sept. 15, 1970, at 41.
139. Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954);
Lindberg v. Coutches, 167 Cal. App. 2d 828, 334 P.2d 701 (1959).
140. 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954).
141. "Seller makes no warranty of any kind, express or implied, concerning
the use of this product. Buyer assumes all risk in use or handling whether




without the pretense of finding fraud, to which the Clements
court was forced to resort.
Lindberg v. Coutches142 demonstrates even greater judicial
ingenuity at circumventing the validity of a disclaimer. In that
case a used airplane was sold "as is" although the aircraft engine
had a hidden defect. The court held that a warranty of air-
worthiness could be implied because the "as is" disclaimer was
rendered ineffectual when the seller permitted the buyer to pur-
chase subject to an inspection which would not have revealed the
defect. Thus, the court defeated the seller's patent effort to avoid
liability other than that for which he specifically contracted by
finding a fatal flaw in the disclaimer itself. Burr and Lindberg
do not hold that disclaimers are invalid per se, but they do indi-
cate how easily a court can brush aside the disclaimer to reach a
just result.
The degree of avoidability of disclaimer clauses is important
if implied warranty is to be a commercially relevant legal tool.
Where courts uniformly uphold disclaimers in favor of the seller
implied warranty serves little purpose; fraud must be established
before the overreaching seller can be made to pay for his exces-
sive pretensions. However, in jurisdictions such as California
where the courts are willing to view disclaimers with an eye to
equity, implied warranty becomes a useful means of balancing
technological risk against economic risk. This is particularly true
of data processing sales. The risk that particular data processing
techniques will not be adequate to solve the complex business
problems to which they are applied can be offset by an appropri-
ate distribution of the risk of loss between the parties. Although
the parties in such situations frequently bargain at arm's length
and-recognizing the possibility of failure-include liquidated
damages provisions in their contracts, the buyer is at the seller's
technological mercy in defining the scope and attributes of the
data 'processing system involved because of the seller's superior
knowledge. In those cases where the seller has dictated a defi-
nition of a system in technical terms, but has defined it so inade-
quately that it will not in fact solve the problem at which it is
aimed, implied warranties may incorporate minimal protections
for the buyer into the contracts by guarantying that the system
must solve at least these problems. However, by expanding the
specifics of the definition of the seller's data processing task to in-
clude the ultimate goal for which the buyer entered into the con-
tract, implied warranty theory leaves the risk of failure subject to
142. 167 Cal. App. 2d 828, 334 P.2d 701 (1959).
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the parties' fairly negotiated business judgment as to risk distribu-
tion. In Burr the court's decision meant that chemicals sprayed
on plants must at least not damage the plants and in Lindberg it
meant that airplanes must at least be airworthy, notwithstanding
disclaimers. Similarly, using Clements as an example, inventory
control systems should be required to control inventory, not with-
standing the seller's efforts to spell out less demanding goals.
However, in none of these situations should the seller who has
failed be liable for damages beyond those contracted for.
Warranties in Data Processing
Contracts for data processing may offer unique opportunities
for warranty disclaimer avoidance. In Clements the Eighth Cir-
cuit held that SBC had represented that the data processing sys-
tem as a whole, irrespective of any specific misrepresentations,
would be an effective tool for the purpose for which it was intend-
ed.' 43 In Sperry Rand Corp. v. Industrial Supply Corp.,'44 the
Fifth Circuit reached a similar conclusion with regard to the
manufacturer's representations concerning its system of tabulating
machines. Industrial Supply had bought a system comprised of
ten punched card tabulators for use in performing certain account-
ing functions. However, the machines did not adequately per-
form their task. Each one of the machines had been sold by its
trade name, 14 5 each had express warranties and there was an in-
tegration clause which purported to exclude liability for repre-
sentations not included in the contract for sale. Nevertheless, an
implied warranty of fitness for the system as a whole was found.14 6
143. Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169, 175 (8th
Cir. 1971); 298 F. Supp. 115, 121, 130 (D. Minn. 1969).
144. 337 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1964).
145. Cf. Lindberg v. Coutches, 167 Cal. App. 2d 828, 334 P.2d 701 (1959),
which said that "Cessna 195" was not a trade name so as to infer anything,
but was only a convenient shorthand between the parties to identify the con-
tract subject.
146. "The transaction between Sperry Rand and Industrial Supply was not
the sale of a single item. It was of the ten items . . . incorporated into a
system intended to be tailored to the needs of Industrial Supply. The opera-
tional functions of these ten machines were keyed together in a manner in-
tended to meet the accounting and record-keeping requirements of the buyer.
They were tailored by Sperry Rand's 'know how' for the particular needs of
Industrial Supply. There is no difference in principle between the incorporating
of specifically described machines into an integrated system and the building
of a specifically designed single piece of equipment for a like purpose. The
sale of a group of specifically described machines, which have been combined
into an integrated system, specially arranged for the purchaser, is not to be
exempted from the otherwise applicable operation of the doctrine of implied
warranty on the ground that the machines comprising the system are patented
and have been designated by trade names." Sperry Rand Corp. v. Industrial
Supply Corp., 337 F.2d 363, 371 (5th Cir. 1964).
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A variation of the Sperry Rand rationale was recently utilized
as a defense in Security Leasing Company v. Flinco, Inc.,'47
where Flinco leased a Computyper 148 from the plaintiff. Al-
though the contracts made no mention of programming services,
the Utah Supreme Court held that the parol evidence rule was not
violated by admitting testimony of promises to provide program-
ming because it was obvious that the Computyper "could not
perform the intended service for Flinco unless it was programmed
into [Flinco's] business .... "149 Beyond the narrow holding
with respect to the parol evidence rule, Flinco suggests that at
least some courts are ready to distinguish between a bare elec-
tronic device and the data processing system which the buyer be-
lieves he is getting.
Sperry Rand and Flinco suggest two ways in which disclaim-
ers of implied warranties can be avoided. First, the system is a
product separate from the sum of its components and can bear
implied warranties separate from those applicable to or excluded
from its components. Second, a computer with programming
must be distinguished from the computer hardware alone. Taken
together these conclusions suggest that because data processing
systems have a designed purpose, the systems themselves bear an
implied warranty that they will effectuate that purpose. Thus, it
may be proper to hold that any disclaimer clause that does not
specifically disclaim liability for failure to accomplish the intended
overall purpose of the system is ineffective, and, as a corollary, that
an implied warranty of fitness for the designed purpose attaches
by operation of law despite any broad, generalized disclaimer.
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO ACTIONS BASED
ON FRAUD OR WARRANTY
Products Liability'5"
A system such as the one designed by SBC in Clements
could have made either SBC or some third party strictly liable in
tort under products liability theory.' 5 Products liability requires
147. 23 U.2d 242, 461 P.2d 460 (Utah Supreme Ct. 1969).
148. A small desk-type computer, made by Friden, Inc.
149. Security Leasing Co. v. Flinco, Inc., 23 U.2d 242, 461 P.2d 460,
461 (Utah Supreme Ct. 1969).
150. With regard to the implications of products liability to the data pro-
cessing industry, see generally Freed, Legal Questions in a Computer Society,
7 TRIAL, Jan. 1971, at 39.
151. Southern California Retailer's Credit Service Co. v. Statistical Tabulat-
ing Corp. (Superior Court, Los Angeles County, March 1968, Docket number
98690) is an action based in part on a strict liability theory. "As the legal
brief puts it, 'defendant designed and manufactured a system to process plain-
tiff's information so as to produce a final product defined as a series of weekly
and monthly reports. . . .'" 15 DATAMATION, July 1969, at 117.
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neither representations about the product nor reliance thereon,152
and in a proper case would greatly reduce the plaintiff's burden of
proof. Furthermore, whereas an action based on innocent mis-
representation requires privity 1 3 and is, therefore, of use only be-
tween the immediate parties to a sale, an action based on products
liability' is available to anyone in the product distributive chain.
Although the range of potential plaintiffs may be restricted to
those with personal injuries or property damage,'1 there is some
authority for extending the reach of this tort concept to commer-
cial injury.1"" But even with these restrictions, products liability
may have applicability to at least two data processing situations.
In one, a third party is damaged by the reports generated by the
system. For example, if the system is a docket control scheme
for a law firm, 157 there may be liability to a litigant whose date
for appeal is missed because of poor system design.'5 8 A remedy
for this situation could be based on either products liability or
implied warranty.15 9
Another situation in which products liability theory would
152. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d
897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962).
153. The requirement in Berven Carpets Corp. v. Davis, 210 Cal. App. 2d
206, 210, 26 Cal. Rptr. 513, 516 (1962) to the effect that a material represen-
tation must be "made with an intent to induce plaintiff to act in reliance
thereon" at least infers that defendant must know who his plaintiff is. Accord,
Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal. 2d 412, 422, 159 P.2d 958, 964 (1945).
154. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d
897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962).
155. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 18, 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45
Cal. Rptr. 17, 23 (1965).
156. Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305, 312
(1965). See also Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 21, 403 P.2d 145,
153, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 25 (1965) (concurring and dissenting opinion).
157. One authority reports that at least five service bureaus offer docket con-
trol and that at least two law firms use such services. Hoffman, Survey oJ
Law Firm Computer Use-1971 (pts. 1-2), 12 JURIMETRICS JOURNAL 42, 86
(1971), at 56, 106. See also Link, Law Olfice Management, in COMPUTERS
AND THE LAW 63 (R. Bigelow ed. 1969).
158. This will not prevent the attorney from being liable jointly with the
data processor. Dicta in two debt collection cases reveal the impatience with
which courts are likely to greet attempts to escape responsibility by blaming
mistakes on the computer. "Trust in the infallibility of a computer is hardly
a defense ...... Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Swarens, 447 S.W.2d 53, 57
(Ky. 1969); accord, Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Hitchcock, 158 S.E.2d 468 (Ga.
1967). See also U.S. v. Williams, 459 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1972), which held
that a search of a criminal suspect made in reliance upon a computer report
that there was reason for suspicion was invalid if the "inputs" to the com-
puter were insufficient to justify the search. Although dictum in the latter case
authorizes reliance on computer reports, the holding diminishes the utility of
computerized data bases to police.
159. See, e.g., Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d
5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962), in which the plaintiff was
allowed to sue the maker of a resin which was applied to the cloth together
with the mill which had made the cloth.
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be relevant is damage to a plaintiff because of a commercially
available "canned" program, purchased by a data processor from
a supplier. 160  The gist of products liability is placing a product
on the market with knowledge that it will be used without in-
spection and consequential injury to person,"" property"' or
(possibly) profits'63 due to a defect in the product. Historically,
most data processing systems have been custom designed; increas-
ingly, however, they are standard packages intended to be used or
installed into larger systems without inspection. As the use of
off-the-shelf program products grows, so will the usefulness of
products liability theory. For example, if the inventory control
system in Clements had been designed by another firm and merely
installed by SBC, Clements might have been able to hold the sup-
plier jointly liable with SBC.
Negligence
Where services alone are involved and neither fraud nor war-
ranty provide a possibility of relief, negligence is the most likely
avenue of recovery for an injured data processing customer.'64
The early data processing cases have indicated that liability is to
some degree predicated on the seller's expertise. 6 5 California
has enunciated a standard of care for experts generally' 66 and a
few standards are available to guide the attorney seeking to prove
negligence in data processing.' 67 However, not all the requisite
measures of competence in the data processing industry have yet
surfaced. 16 8
160. 17 DATAMATION, Aug. 15, 1971, at 19. See also 17 DATAMATION,
July 15, 1971, at 64; 16 DATAMATION, March 1970, at 54; the news article
entitled "Software by Mail at $1 per Day," 17 DATAMATION, July 1, 1971,
at 57.
161. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d
897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962).
162. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 19, 403 P.2d 145, 152, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 17, 24 (1965).
163. Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305, 312
(1965); Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 21, 403 P.2d 145, 153, 45
Cal. Rptr. 17, 25 (1965) (concurring and dissenting opinion).
164. The customer, plaintiff in Computer Credit Systems, Inc. v. Control
Data Corp. (D. Ga. June 15, 1971) (reported in Computerworld, July 7, 1971,
at 1) is proceeding on a malpractice theory inter alia in its suit against a time-
shared data processing service. See also Landy, supra note 4.
165. Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169, 182-3 (8th
Cir. 1971); Strand v. Librascope, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 743, 752 (D. Mich. 1961).
166. Experts have "a duty to exercise the ordinary skill and competence of
members of their profession". Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 489, 275
P.2d 15, 21 (1954).
167. See, e.g., Bigelow, Some Legal and Regulatory Problems of Multiple
Access Computer Networks, 11 JURIMETRICS JOURNAL 47 (1970); Hicks, ANSI
COBOL, 16 DATAMATION, Nov. 1, 1970, at 32.




California courts will soon confront the questions raised by
Clements Auto Company v. Service Bureau Corporation.'0 9
When they do, they should base liability on an implied warranty
theory, rather than the Clements fraud rationale because implied
warranty will be more conducive to promoting proper negotiations
between the parties. There may be a disparity in technological
skills which forces the buyer of data processing services to rely on
the computer expert; such disparity is consistent with either fraud
or warranty. 170  There is no disparity in business acumen. A
businessman buyer of data processing services may not be able to
judge whether the specifics of a proposal will in fact accomplish
the desired purposes, but he is able to gauge what cost will accrue
to him from failure to accomplish them. He can, then, negotiate
a limitation to the seller's liability which expresses his judgment.
The Clements solution to the problem of an insufficiently precise
definition of the purpose of a system-liability for tortious inno-
cent misrepresentation-is too tough on the data processing ser-
vices industry; it leaves service bureaus liable for unlimited dam-
ages. Worse yet, it places none of the responsibility for defining
the purpose on the customer. Implied warranty, on the other
hand, enables the parties to split the risk of loss through limitation
of liability clauses and thereby encourages the buyer as well as
the seller to specify precisely what he wants the system to accom-
plish. Where the seller has intentionally or negligently misrepre-
sented, fraud is the proper basis for relief. But where the untrue
representations are innocently made, a public policy in favor of
open and thorough negotiation of contracts would demand that
necessary relief be afforded on the basis of implied warranty.
It will not be enough to treat injuries after they have oc-
curred. Prophylaxis too is needed. The justifiable reliance in
Clements rested on the expertise of the data processor. Expertise
is regulated by license in other professions.' 7' The legislature
growing and changing industries, with few generally accepted standards of con-
duct." Scaletta, The Legal Ramifications of the Computer Age, 8 DATA
MANAGEMENT, Oct. 1970, at 12; accord, Banzhaf, When a Computer Needs a
Lawyer, 71 DICKINSON LAw REv. 240, 242 (1967).
169. 444 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1971), modifying 298 F. Supp. 115 (D. Minn.
1969).
170. Compare Bank of America v. Hutchinson, 212 Cal. App. 2d 142, 27
Cal. Rptr. 787 (1963), with, e.g., Sutter v. Associated Seed Growers, 31 Cal.
App. 2d 543, 88 P.2d 144 (1939).
171. See generally CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE (West 1971). Id. §§ 2141,
2142.5 and 2142.10 make it a misdemeanor to practice medicine without a li-
cense. Id. §§ 2191 and 2192 set minimal educational standards for a li-
cense to practice. Similarly, id. §§ 6002, 6125 and 6060 guarantee a minimum
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should look for standards for licensing data processing services
and salesmen.17 2  A tentative start has been made, 173 but if this
new industry is to perform a useful function in the commercial
world, the California Legislature must follow up on its early ef-
forts before a number of Clements-like situations arise.
Jerry A. Philpott
level of expertise in attorneys; id. §§ 5055, 5081 and 5083 apply in a similar
fashion to certified public accountants. Some other professions which the legis-
lature has seen fit to regulate are: barbers, id. §§ 6500-6636, engineers,
id. §§ 6700-6799, collection agencies, id. §§ 6850-6956.2, contractors, id.
§§ 7000-7058, and yacht and ship brokers, id. §§ 8900-8975.
172. Graduate programs in computer science [see White, The 70's: People,
16 DATAMATION, July 15, 1970, at 40, 42] and undergraduate fields of speciali-
zation in data processing [see 16 DATAMATON, June 1970, at 163] provide a
starting point. See also Bigelow, Some Legal and Regulatory Problems of Mul-
tiple Access Computer Networks, 11 JURIMETRICS JOURNAL 47, 50 (1970).
173. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 9984.5 (West 1971) specifies that em-
ployment agencies that would advertise their reliance on computers are limited
to a $15.00 fee, must keep applicants on their files for one year, and must
process their applications at least weekly and report to them within 48 hours
after matching them to a job. See also 16 DATAMATION, November 1, 1970,
at 97.
